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Introduction and summary
During the 1990s, some payment analysts suggested
that smart cards1 with e-purse applications could be a
promising new payment option for certain types of trans-
actions. An e-purse is a stored-value payment device
that offers the following features to the consumer: It
holds electronic monetary value that substitutes for
cash; it does not require online authorization; it records
the value of each purchase on the card rather than a
central computer server; and it can be exchanged for
goods and services from various merchants. The de-
vice is generally stored on a computer chip, which can
reside on any one of a number of items most consumers
already carry, such as a payment card, mobile phone,
key chain, or even a watch. When the consumer makes
a purchase, monetary value is deducted from the mi-
crochip on the card.
The key difference between a stored-value smart
card and debit, credit, payroll, and gift cards is that
value is stored directly on the smart card rather than
stored in an account on a central computer server, and
therefore, transactions are processed offline between
the smart card and the card reader at the point of sale
(POS). In contrast, debit, credit, payroll, and gift cards
in the United States are offered on magnetic stripe
cards, and payment involves an online authorization
that requires a real-time connection with a central com-
puter. The purchase is approved or declined through
the authorization process, which checks whether there
is sufficient value in the account for debit, payroll,
and gift card transactions and whether the credit limit
has not been exceeded for credit card transactions.
The authorization process may also check whether
the card is fraudulent or stolen.
Some payment analysts predicted that smart cards
could lead to a cashless society, one in which e-purs-
es would replace cash and coins for low-value pay-
ments. As we know, this hasn’t happened. Although
a number of e-purse programs have been implement-
ed around the world, these programs have experienced
varying degrees of success, and many have failed out-
right. Smart card adoption in the United States has been
slower than in the rest of the world. Many analysts argue
that this is partly because the U.S. already has an ad-
vanced telecommunications infrastructure that can
verify magnetic stripe card transactions quickly and
cheaply online. This results in relatively low fraud
levels and relatively high levels of satisfaction among
businesses and consumers with the current systems.
If this is true, then smart card applications may offer
more value in other parts of the world with less highly
developed telecommunications infrastructures and high-
er incidences of fraud in existing payments networks.
In this article, I review six e-purse smart card
programs in Hong Kong (one) and the United States
(five). I chose these two regions because Hong Kong
has one of the most highly successful e-purse programs,
the Octopus card, and the United States has imple-
mented a number of e-purse programs, some of which
have been more widely adopted than others. I find
that the most successful among these programs tend
to have the following characteristics: a captive audi-
ence that drives critical mass, such as those found in
the transportation industry or government sector; an
affordable cost structure relative to other payment in-
struments; compelling incentives to consumers and
merchants; and a technology that is well tested and
addresses standards issues before the rollout.35 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Below, I survey the theoretical framework of pre-
vious smart card studies, provide an overview of the
payments environment in Hong Kong and the United
States, and analyze six e-purse programs in these two
regions and the factors that contributed to their success
or failure. Then, I discuss the implications of my find-
ings for future e-purse programs.
Literature review
One of the greatest challenges in the adoption of
a new payment device is establishing a critical mass
of users. Regardless of the type of technology used,
consumers are reluctant to use a new payment instru-
ment if few merchants accept it, and merchants will
refuse to accept the device because the cost of install-
ing and maintaining the supporting technology infra-
structure, like card readers, may be prohibitive, unless
enough consumers want to use it. New payment mecha-
nisms gain momentum when enough people use them,
which leads to widespread acceptance by the merchant
community. Critical mass, however, is not only relat-
ed to the number of users but also to the actual levels
of usage because the program’s profitability is generally
dependent on high transaction volumes (Goldfinger,
1998). As Rochet and Tirole (2003) observe, merchants
cannot benefit much from consumers that hold a pay-
ment card but use it only sporadically. The more fre-
quently the card is used, the more valuable it becomes
to consumers and merchants. Therefore, frequent use
is one of the keys to a successful e-purse program.
Goldfinger (1998) estimates that a critical mass
of one million users was needed for a smart card pro-
gram to attain profitability due to the large fixed costs
of the infrastructure, although these costs have likely
fallen in recent years.2 To achieve this, Goldfinger ar-
gues that program promoters have to be able to or-
chestrate a large-scale deployment and initiate a
migration/switching process from the existing pay-
ment system to the smart card system. He takes the
view that the benefits that smart cards provide cannot
be fully realized if there is an alternative payment in-
frastructure present. While this is certainly not the
case for mature payment infrastructures—cash, checks,
debit cards, and credit cards coexist at most retailers—
there may be some validity to this argument in the
case of an emerging payment instrument like an
e-purse.
In another study, Van Hove (2004) examines data
on 16 e-purse systems in Europe. Van Hove finds that
successful programs are in countries that are relatively
small geographically or have phased introductions;
that have online debit card systems that are fairly
popular or cannot be used for low-value payments;
that have stakeholders that quickly agree on a com-
mon solution so there are no incompatibility problems;
that have major banks committed to and participating
in the program; and that have support from key players
that operate and support one or more of the following:
public telephones, parking meters, vending machines,
or public transportation.
Chakravorti (2004) finds three other necessary
conditions for a viable new payment instrument: There
must be benefits that are not provided in existing pay-
ment instruments for at least certain transactions; con-
sumers and merchants must be convinced of these
benefits and, possibly, provided with incentives to
change their behavior; and the new system must be
perceived as secure, with adequate measures against
credit risk and fraud.
Payments environment in Hong Kong and
the United States
As I explained in the introduction, I am interested
in comparing programs in Hong Kong and the United
States because Hong Kong has one of the most highly
successful e-purse programs, the Octopus card, and
the United States has implemented a number of e-purse
programs with varying degrees of success. As figure 1
shows, Dove Consulting (2003) reported that in 2003
electronic payments surpassed other types of payments
for in-store purchases for the first time in the United
States. However, cash was still the most popular pay-
ment vehicle.
Cash is used even more widely in Hong Kong.
Eric Tai, chief executive officer of Octopus Cards
Ltd., indicates that Hong Kong residents use coins
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and currency 50 percent of the time. Checks are used
for retail transactions, where credit and debit cards are
not accepted, and credit cards have become increasingly
popular, with over nine million in circulation in 2001
(Bank for International Settlements, Committee on
Payment and Settlement Systems, 2003). Interestingly,
however, in Hong Kong, e-purse transactions are now
growing faster than either debit or credit card trans-
actions—Euromonitor International (2004) reports
that they increased by 8 percent in 2003, compared
with 7 percent growth in debit card transactions and
2 percent growth in credit card transactions.
While the United States and Hong Kong have each
implemented a number of e-purse programs, only Hong
Kong’s Octopus card, which began in the niche trans-
portation industry and extended outward to retailers,
has been widely adopted by consumers and a diverse
number of merchants. More than 95 percent of Hong
Kong’s residents aged 15–65 carry the card. Over
50,000 smart card readers accept Octopus at public
transportation terminals, convenience stores, fast food
chains, leisure facilities, parking meters and garages,
pay phones, personal care stores, photo booths, photo-
copiers, school snack shops, supermarkets, taxis, and
vending machines (Tai, 2005). In August 2005, Octopus
announced an apparel retailer will accept the card at
its Hong Kong locations. Some e-purse programs in
the United States that began in niche markets are cur-
rently successful, but on a much smaller scale.
Octopus processes over nine million transactions
each day with an average daily transaction value of
about HK$65 million (US$8.3 million) amounting to
about 2 percent of Hong Kong’s gross domestic product
(GDP) in 2003 (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 2004).3 Retail purchases in
Hong Kong using the Octopus card grew from 5 per-
cent in January 2002 (Trintech Group Plc, 2003) to
17 percent of total transactions in August 2005 (Wong,
2005). With about US$1.4 million in average daily re-
tail transactions, Octopus takes in more in a single day
than the widely reported Mondex and Visa Cash trial in
New York City did during the entire 15-month program.4
As I mentioned earlier, most payment analysts
agree that smart card adoption in the United States has
been slower than in the rest of the world because the
United States has an advanced telecommunications
infrastructure that can verify magnetic stripe credit
and debit card transactions quickly and cheaply online.
This results in relatively low fraud levels and relatively
high levels of satisfaction among businesses and con-
sumers with the current systems. Smart card applica-
tions may offer more value in other parts of the world
with less highly developed telecommunications in-
frastructures and higher fraud incidences.
The business case for smart cards in the United
States also depends on a number of other factors. There
are issues related to who would pay for the extra chip
on the card and to what fees merchants would pay on
a per transaction basis. In Hong Kong, merchants ap-
pear to be paying lower rates on Octopus transactions
than on credit card transactions.
There are also differences in the technology used
for stored-value cards in the two regions. Octopus pro-
vides e-purse capabilities on a contactless smart card,
which means the card does not have to be inserted into
a card reader like credit or debit cards. Instead, it is
held close to the reader and payment is registered in
0.3 seconds. Meanwhile, Duetto cards offered by the
coffee chain company Starbucks, payroll cards that are
used instead of direct deposit or paychecks by some
firms to deliver an employee’s pay, and gift cards of-
fered by various retailers in the United States provide
stored-value capabilities on magnetic stripe cards. There
are two ostensible reasons for using magnetic stripe
cards rather than contactless smart cards in the United
States: the cost of equipping stores with chip reading
terminals and the desire to include Visa, MasterCard,
or private label branding since these cards are processed
by online readers.5 In addition, some payment providers
in the United States offer contactless smart cards but
link purchases to credit card or debit card accounts
rather than to an e-purse—examples include Exxon-
Mobil’s SpeedPass, Bank of America’s QuickWave,
and MasterCard’s PayPass. In an interesting develop-
ment, in December 2004, the Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority began piloting 20,000 Master-
Card branded magnetic stripe cards that also contain
a stored-value chip for transportation (Garback, 2005).
Case studies
I examine six e-purse case studies that began in
“closed-loop” environments in Hong Kong and the
United States, meaning they were offered to what one
might call a captive audience, such as one found in a
military facility or university campus. The e-purse pro-
grams that were tested in open-loop environments in
these two regions have failed outright, such as the
Mondex and Visa Cash trial in New York City cited
previously.6 I chose the case studies to represent a cross
section of industries that have implemented e-purse
programs in recent years: transportation, government,
and higher education. The Octopus card’s e-purse trans-
action volumes and values are among the highest in the
world. The Ohio Electronic Benefit Transfer program,
which has higher transaction values and volumes than37 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Octopus, is the largest smart card program for adminis-
tering food stamps in the United States. The Univer-
sity of Michigan Mcard represents one of the largest
university deployments of an e-purse in the United
States. The University of Central Florida UCF Card
is one of the few campus e-purse programs still in
operation. The Navy Cash™ card and the EagleCash
card programs are two of three smart card programs
administered by the U.S. Department of the Treasury
for the U.S. Armed Forces. A synopsis of the six pro-
grams, as well as a detailed discussion on how each
card works, is included in the appendix.
Octopus card
The Octopus card began in the niche transporta-
tion industry when Hong Kong’s five leading compa-
nies for trains, buses, ferries, and subways formed a
joint venture in 1994 to oversee the implementation
of a smart card system. After three years of develop-
ment and trials, they launched Octopus in 1997. In
1999, 7-Eleven stores in Hong Kong became the first
locations outside the mass transit system where riders
could add value to cards. The convenience store chain
liked the speed and ease of the contactless technolo-
gy so much that it installed readers in its stores in the
following year so that consumers could pay for goods
using Octopus. In time, consumers began to press other
retailers to accept the card as well (Ramstad, 2004).
A number of factors were crucial to the success
of the Octopus card: the support of five transportation
companies; the interoperability of the system; the man-
ner in which critical mass was established by lever-
aging the captive and niche transportation industry;
the reliable technology; and the compelling incentives
offered to consumers and merchants.
Factors influencing success
Octopus has the support of Hong Kong’s five ma-
jor transportation companies. Although some of these
companies compete directly for riders, the savings they
achieved by implementing a shared smart card system
appear to have outweighed any competition concerns
(Poon and Chau, 2001). This also implies that the prof-
it-sharing scheme the transportation companies worked
out is equitable enough to induce cooperation. For con-
sumers, the development of a single interoperable system
means they can access any public transportation in Hong
Kong with the same card. In contrast, 40 miles from
Hong Kong in Macau, two bus companies launched sepa-
rate incompatible e-ticket systems that failed to reach
critical mass because traveling in the area typically
requires a combination of buses and most people were
not willing to carry two different cards (Uzureau, 2003).
Octopus has also been free of technology-related
problems, unlike several smart card programs that
have had trials in the United States. Very few failures
of the Octopus card were reported during the first
month of operation. On average, station personnel
needed to resolve problems in only one out of every
11,000 journeys (Wynne, 1998).7
Octopus also uses radio frequency identification
(RFID) technology, which allows commuters to wave
their card (or a purse or wallet containing the card) within
4 inches of the reader at the ticket barrier to register
payment within 0.3 seconds (BusinessWorld Publish-
ing Corporation, 2002). Thus, an Octopus card trans-
action takes less time than a cash transaction in which
one may have to wait for change, and takes significant-
ly less time than the typical credit or debit card trans-
action in which magnetic stripe technology is used.
Moreover, the durable smart cards have a potential
life span of about 100,000 transactions (Tai, 2005).
And Octopus’s functionality has been embodied in a
variety of forms, including key chains, mobile phones,
and watches.
What about incentives? Initially, Octopus offered
consumers a 10 percent savings and a 100 percent sat-
isfaction guarantee to increase adoption in the trans-
portation sector and to remove uncertainty about the
new technology (Tai, 2005). These incentives, along
with the simplicity, speed, and convenience of the
system’s technology, resulted in over three million
cards being issued during the first three months and
established a critical mass of smart card users who
were familiar with RFID technology.
Metro and rail transportation operators offer mul-
tiple ride tickets on the Octopus card and single ride
tickets on magnetic stripe cards (Wong, 2005). This
is significant because over 70 percent of Hong Kong
residents use some form of public transportation each
day (Poon and Chau, 2001) and are more likely to use
the multiple ride tickets offered by Octopus. Tai (2005)
reports that constraining multiple ride tickets to Oc-
topus cards elicited little consumer dissatisfaction. Metro
and rail transportation operators provide discounts to
Octopus cards over single ticket cards; the discounts
vary according to the distance traveled. Smart card adop-
tion for metro riders is 90 percent and for rail com-
muters over 80 percent (Wong, 2005).
Transportation operators for buses, minibuses, and
ferries accept coins or Octopus cards, and fares are
the same for each payment method. Octopus card adop-
tion on these transportation lines is somewhat lower
compared with the metro and rail lines—70 percent
for ferry lines, about 80 percent for minibuses, and
over 80 percent for buses. Although buses, minibuses,38 4Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
and ferries do not consistently offer a discount to
Octopus cardholders as do the metro and rail lines, they
do sometimes launch promotional campaigns that of-
fer discounts to Octopus cardholders only.
Once a critical mass of smart card users was es-
tablished in the transportation industry, the proven
technology was used to branch out into the retail mar-
ket, where consumers were offered a number of ben-
efits that helped foster adoption. Octopus is a single
convenient, multipurpose card that speeds retail trans-
actions and replaces cash for small purchases. In con-
trast to other e-purse programs, Octopus actually allows
cardholders to make purchases up to a negative value
of HK$35 (US$4), so long as the card contains a posi-
tive value of HK$0.01 before the purchase. Once the
card has a negative value, it must be reloaded before
it is used again. Octopus recovers the negative balance
through the deposit and purchase price of the cards.
For a detailed discussion of the types of Octopus cards,
deposit amounts, and card costs, see the appendix.
Merchants also enjoy a number of benefits.
Octopus reduces cash handling and in-store queues,
and increases customer loyalty by allowing merchants
to offer ad hoc discounts to customers using the card.
It is difficult to determine the cost to retailers of ac-
cepting the card, since data on hardware costs and
merchant fees are confidential. The World Bank’s web-
site indicates that Octopus has a two-part transaction
fee. There is a HK$0.02 charge for every transaction
to cover the costs of technical support, computer op-
erations, and replacement cards and a 0.75 percent
charge on the transaction value to cover card-control
operations, legal, marketing, and depreciation costs.
Therefore, a HK$10 transaction would include a fee
of HK$0.02 plus HK$0.075, or HK$0.095 (Rebelo,
1999). However, Octopus Cards Ltd. has indicated
that these transaction charges vary depending on mer-
chant volume (Cheng, 2004).
Despite the uncertainty about exact costs, it ap-
pears likely that retailers in Hong Kong benefit from
lower transaction fees for the Octopus card relative to
transaction fees for credit cards, which vary from 2 per-
cent to 4.5 percent (Morgan and Snee, 1997). Although
new locations like McDonald’s are accepting Octopus
(Tai, 2005), some merchants still find Octopus fees
to be too expensive. In CardTechnology, Balaban
(2005) reports that a few retailers like Starbucks have
reduced the number of outlets that accept Octopus.
Ohio EBT program
In the United States, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) has
shifted qualified low-income families from paper
food stamp coupons to electronic benefit transfer (EBT)
cards. The EBT program was designed to reduce fraud,
to eliminate the cumbersome manual processes asso-
ciated with issuing and redeeming paper food stamps,
and to lessen the stigma associated with being a tradi-
tional food stamp recipient. In 2003, 9.1 million U.S.
households redeemed an average of $1.7 billion in
food stamps every month using EBT cards. To reduce
fraud, the system creates an electronic record of each
transaction that can help identify where food stamps
are trafficked or exchanged illegally (U.S. Department
of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, 2004).
States have taken different approaches to admin-
istering the EBT program. Forty-eight states have im-
plemented magnetic stripe systems that require online
authorization from a host computer that keeps track
of value. Two states, Ohio and Wyoming, use offline
smart card systems that store value on a computer
chip resident on the card. The state of Ohio has an-
nounced, however, that it is discontinuing its smart
card program, Direction Card, which has been in place
since 1996, and is seeking bids for an online system
(Welsh-Huggins, 2003).
Factors influencing failure
John Scaggs (2005), Ohio’s EBT project director,
indicated that the decision to discontinue Ohio’s offline
system was based on cost, as well as on the failure of
credit card companies to build a smart card infrastruc-
ture, which had been anticipated when the program
was implemented in the mid-1990s. The online system
will be installed no later than June 2006.
The decision to discontinue the program followed
a 2002 study by Abt Associates, Inc. (2002) that com-
pared Ohio’s program with the findings of the three
most recent EBT system evaluations. These included
the online system in the state of Maryland; the offline
pilot in Dayton, Ohio, on which the Direction Card
system was later built; and the offline system in the
state of Wyoming. The study found Direction Card
was more expensive than Maryland’s online system,
but less expensive than the offline systems in Dayton,
Ohio, and Wyoming. Abt Associates estimated that
the total operational costs of the Direction Card system
were 56 percent higher than Maryland’s system due
to more expensive hardware, software, and local agency
costs. The Direction Card was 29 percent less expen-
sive than the Dayton pilot because of the larger scale
of the Direction Card program, the lower costs of
building the Direction Card system upon the Dayton
pilot, and the decreased technology costs resulting
from technological developments that emerged after
the Dayton pilot was deployed. The Direction Card39 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
was 43 percent less expensive than Wyoming’s pro-
gram due to lower local, state, customer service, data
center hardware, software, POS, and card costs (Abt
Associates, Inc., 2002).8
The Abt Associates study also reviewed advan-
tages and disadvantages of the Direction Card from
the perspective of retailers. Ohio’s merchants received
free terminal installation, initial user training, and
maintenance; however, they never found a cost-effec-
tive way to integrate the offline system into their ex-
isting online POS devices. Therefore, Ohio retailers
bore the ongoing costs of training staff to use the sepa-
rate terminal, not to mention lost counter space. There
were also differences in costs related to equipping
store lanes with EBT POS devices. Even though the
number of POS devices given to large retailers by Ohio
was more generous than the FNS mandated, large re-
tailers did not have enough terminals to equip every
checkout lane in the store. To do so, they would have
to pay for extra POS devices. In contrast, online mer-
chants that integrated EBT transactions into existing
POS devices could service EBT customers in any lane.
However, most online systems did not pay the costs
of integrating cards into existing POS devices, which
then shifted the costs of doing so to the merchant.
Those online merchants that did not integrate EBT
transactions into existing POS devices either used the
state’s allotment of EBT terminals or paid for extra
equipment, but online terminals were less expensive
than offline terminals (Abt Associates, Inc., 2002).
The Abt Associates study also compared the ex-
periences of Ohio’s EBT cardholders with those of
EBT recipients accessing online systems. While Ohio
recipients had higher levels of service due to hands-on
training at Direction Card system offices, this special-
ized training also required extra time from the card-
holder and sometimes necessitated an added trip to
the local office. In contrast, states with online systems
piggybacked on the widespread use of magnetic stripe
cards for other applications, as well as typically pro-
viding cards, training materials, and personal identi-
fication numbers (PINs) by mail. There were also
differences in loading value onto the card. Ohio EBT
recipients are required to load their benefits at any one
of three stores of their choosing or at their local food
stamp office. In contrast, EBT recipients with magnet-
ic stripe cards do not have to load value on the card
at any specific location because value is stored on the
central computer server (Abt Associates, Inc., 2002).
In addition, EBT smart card recipients may have
experienced more confusion about the current value
on their cards. Almost 90 percent of the Direction
Card calls to customer service centers were to check
the card balance. Similarly, the majority of customer
service calls for online systems were to check account
balances. The report indicates, however, that there
may be an additional reason for balance inquiry calls
for offline cards. The Direction Card system deducts
the purchase amount from the chip on the card at the
time of purchase. Information about the transaction is
sent to the central computer server via batch processing
at the end of the day when the beneficiary’s account
information is updated. In contrast, online systems veri-
fy transactions real-time against the central computer
server, and balances are updated immediately. Thus,
offline card users may have been confused by the bal-
ance information on the audio response unit, which
obtains information from the central computer server
on a lag basis, compared with their knowledge of the
available balance based on known card transactions
and expected benefits (Abt Associates, Inc., 2002).
The Abt Associates report also considered the
transferability and adaptability of Ohio’s Direction
Card to food stamp programs in other states. The main
obstacle cited was the need to build a system from
scratch, since few retailers have POS devices capable
of reading smart cards because consumer demand for
these cards has not reached a critical mass. Moreover,
EBT recipients outside Wyoming and Ohio benefit
from the interoperability of online systems, allowing
them to access benefits in 48 states. Ohio and Wyoming
recipients can only use smart cards in their own respec-
tive states, unless an out-of-state store is specially
equipped to accept them.9
Campus smart cards
Numerous e-purse programs have been imple-
mented in closed-loop college and university environ-
ments for a variety of reasons: Students are open to
new technologies; universities are able to implement
more secure IDs that are not as easily duplicated as
magnetic stripe cards; and schools are able to reduce
administrative costs and to generate transaction fee
income. Despite these benefits, most campus smart
card trials have failed. In University Business maga-
zine, Villano (2004) reports that of the approximately
50 schools in the United States that implemented smart
card programs from 1997 to 2002, only a handful are
still using them and relatively few take full advantage
of the capabilities the technology provides. Failures
are attributed to the high costs of offline systems com-
pared with those of online systems, lack of interoper-
ability, and delays in batch processing that mean card
balances may not be updated for up to 24 hours.40 4Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
University of Michigan
One of the largest e-purse deployments at a cam-
pus in the United States began at the University of
Michigan in 1995 in response to students’ and merchants’
requests that the school’s Entrée Plus system be ex-
tended off campus (Mayer, 1996). Entrée Plus was a
funds pool into which parents put money at the begin-
ning of the year for meals at residence halls and snack
bars, as well as for on-campus purchases at vending
machines, bookstores, and laundry facilities (Mitchell,
1998). As it turned out, it was not feasible to expand
the Entrée Plus system off campus, so the university
developed a proprietary offline POS network called
the Mcard (Mayer, 1996).
In June 2001, the university announced that smart
cards would be gradually discontinued and replaced
with magnetic stripe cards (Avisian, Inc., 2002). A
number of factors influenced the failure of the offline
system, including technology problems; the overall
cost relative to online systems; the lack of a critical
mass of users and merchants; confusion related to
concurrent programs on the card;10 and the apparent
lack of a business case at the outset.
Factors influencing failure
In terms of technical problems, outdoor card readers
did not function well in cold weather, and transaction
times took longer than cash (Mitchell and O’Brien,
1999). In addition, the chip on the Mcard malfunctioned
nearly one-quarter of the time when it was first im-
plemented (Doyle, 2005). Some cashiers had not
been properly trained, which resulted in delays, and
students became frustrated and eventually mistrustful
of the card (Michigan Daily, 1996).
Over time, the school found that the Mcard was
more useful as a coin substitute than as a paper cur-
rency replacement. As such, the school required tech-
nology that would support pay phone, parking meter,
and central parking facility transactions, but these were
beyond the capability of the system (Doyle, 2005).
Faced with an obsolete technology, the university
sought bids from Visa, Mondex, and Proton to update
the program. However, costs were considered too
high, and the school announced it would revert to an
online system (Kuykendall, 2001).
Moreover, usage of the Mcard was lower than
expected. Over a year after its implementation, trans-
action volumes were 20 percent less than anticipated
and dollar values 30 percent to 35 percent below target
(Chakravorty, 1996). Although usage rates would gen-
erally be lower at the beginning of any new payment
technology, the Mcard illustrates a classic dilemma:
Cardholders wanted more merchants to accept the
card, while merchants wanted more cardholders to
use it.
It was also hoped that the Mcard program would
provide students and staff with a convenient payment
tool that would generate revenues for the school. The
Mcard included a microchip for payments, a bar code
for checking out library books, and a magnetic stripe
that functioned as a debit card as well as provided build-
ing access. Phone card functionality was also includ-
ed on the card (Mitchell, 1998). The University of
Michigan received part of the ATM transaction fees
and calling card revenues in addition to 50 percent of
the merchant transaction fees paid to the school’s bank,
First of America (Doyle, 2005). However, students
and parents were confused by the many concurrent
programs that operated separately on the card. In ad-
dition, students preferred the Entrée Plus program to
the e-purse program. With Entrée Plus, parents could
deposit funds to a university account that students
could draw from to make on-campus purchases, where-
as with the e-purse, students typically used their own
money to load value onto the chip (Mitchell and
O’Brien, 1999).
Moreover, the on-campus rollout of the Mcard
was not well coordinated, and merchant fees were
viewed as high. Only one of the campus’s 22 libraries
accepted the card for photocopies because most had
already implemented their own copy systems prior to
Mcard’s launch (Doyle, 2005). Some other campus
locations did not accept the Mcard, and the number
of purchases with the Mcard was lower than with credit
cards. On-campus merchants initially paid fees of 4
percent for transactions on the chip and BankStripe
(a closed-loop debit card linked to a First of America
checking account), which were later lowered to 2.8
percent, while off-campus merchants consistently paid
4 percent (Doyle, 2005). Merchant interest in the pro-
gram was also low due to the high cost of the card
reader, $900, resulting from the lack of competition
from other vendors (Gale Group, Inc., 1998).11
Finally, it is unclear whether a business case for
smart card over magnetic stripe technology was fully
developed. The Mcard program was originally piloted
as a magnetic-stripe ID card. When the supplier that
provided the cards and readers was purchased by a
leading smart card vendor a few months after the pilot
began, the university’s bank suggested that a micro-
chip be added to the magnetic stripe card to facilitate
faster on- and off-campus payments and to provide
students with a cash substitute for pizza deliveries to
dorms and for meals in restaurants (Mitchell, 1998).41 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
University of Central Florida
Another campus card program was implemented
in 1998 at the University of Central Florida (UCF)
and remains in operation. The UCF Card is a required
student ID and includes a magnetic stripe for debit card
transactions and a computer chip with three separate
e-purses. Cardholders must have an account with Sun-
Trust, the issuing bank, to use the debit card function-
ality.12 The main reason the program was implemented
was to complement the university’s image as a cut-
ting-edge technology school. Three factors appear to
be influencing the current success of the UCF Card:
in-house processing, the requirement for the card to
be used in the computer lab, and merchant and stu-
dent interest in expanding the program off campus.
Factors influencing success
Tamara Kidder (2005), the UCF Card manager,
reports that the university now performs its own trans-
action processing, which is quicker than the processing
offered by their initial vendor. Moreover, the number
of students and staff using the UCF Card increased
from 20 percent in 2003 to 50 percent in the summer
of 2004 as a result of the computer lab requiring the
card for print copies. Students also enjoy the security
of two PIN-protected e-purses; if the UCF Card is lost
or stolen, these funds can be transferred to a new card.
Similar to the evolution of the Octopus card, the
expansion of the UCF Card off campus was driven
by both student and merchant demand. Currently, the
card is used to purchase on-campus pizza deliveries
and off-campus meals at six fast food and other restau-
rants. Twenty additional merchants are interested in
joining the program (Kidder, 2005), which suggests
that the 3 percent merchant discount fee is not viewed
as a barrier.
Military smart cards
One other sector where e-purse applications have
been developed and implemented successfully in the
United States, albeit in a fairly narrow range of cash
management applications, is the U.S. government.
Since the inception of its stored-value card (SVC)
program in 1997, the U.S. Department of the Treasury
has issued more than 1.4 million smart cards that sup-
port specific business processes within each branch
of the U.S. Armed Forces (Mackenzie, 2004).13 The
program aims to end the float loss associated with
the more than $2 billion in coin and currency in circu-
lation on military bases, ships, and other locations world-
wide—and the associated cost of securing, transporting,
and accounting for cash held outside the Treasury. The
cards also eliminate the manually intensive back-end
operations necessary to support scrip, vouchers, meal
tickets, money orders, traveler’s checks, and other
paper payment mechanisms used in closed government
environments. Two types of SVC cards currently in
use are Navy Cash™ and EagleCash.14
Navy Cash™ card
Navy Cash™ reduces the cash handling and fidu-
ciary costs associated with safeguarding and storing
large amounts of paper currency and coins on board
ships by combining two technologies on the same
card: smart card chip and magnetic stripe. The e-purse
on the chip is used for onboard purchases, and the
magnetic stripe is used for purchases during shore leave.
On a recent voyage of the USS Harry S. Truman, which
has a crew of 5,000, there were over US$1 million in
sales using the Navy Cash™ card (Gosnell, 2004). As
of September 30, 2005, 66 ships have been deployed
with Navy Cash™, and a total of 160 are scheduled
to convert to the system by 2008 (Straw, 2005a).
Factors influencing success
A number of factors are influencing the current
success of the Navy Cash™ program, including cost
savings for the Navy, high customer satisfaction among
crew members, and powerful incentives that drive
critical mass.
Navy Cash™ reduces labor-intensive cash handling
as well as lowers fiduciary and reporting costs by de-
creasing the need for paper currency and coins on board
ships by 50 percent to 60 percent. In addition, a “cash-
less” shipboard environment allows more time for
crew members to focus on core mission functions. Navy
Cash™ also provides crew members with greater ser-
vices and security, and supports access to home bank
and credit union accounts. The Navy Cash™ system
has been taken successfully around the world with a
high rate of customer satisfaction (Straw, 2005b).
The Navy is very motivated to cut costs, and pro-
vides cards free of charge to crew members. While
adoption of the program by servicemen and service-
women is voluntary, those crew members who choose
to forgo the card cannot make onboard purchases at
retail POS terminals or at vending machines. Instead,
they only receive standard food and supplies issued
by the Navy, as no cash is accepted on the ship
(Rivers, 2004).
EagleCash
A second military stored-value smart card called
EagleCash began in 1999. It is used by U.S. Army
and civilian workers in parts of the world with weak
telecommunications and banking infrastructures. Per-
sonnel use the reloadable card on bases to purchase
goods and services as well as foreign currency. First42 4Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
deployed in Bosnia, the EagleCash smart card is also
used in Afghanistan, Honduras, Kosovo, Macedonia, Qa-
tar, and Uzbekistan. Future deployments may include
military bases in Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the
Sinai (De Jesus, 2005).
Factors influencing success
The current success of the EagleCash program
can be attributed to a number of factors. Staff is able
to pay for goods in countries where banking and tele-
communications infrastructures are weak and benefit
from faster checkout lines at on-base POS terminals,
where checkout times decreased by an average of 45
seconds (Federal Document Clearing House, Inc.,
2000). The military benefits from a reduction in U.S.
currency in hostile areas, which could potentially be
used to fund terrorism due to the stronger market value
of the U.S. dollar in these regions (Thompson, 2004).
The risk of counterfeiting and black marketing is also
diminished. In the Balkans, EagleCash lowered U.S. cur-
rency in circulation by $160 million (De Jesus, 2005).
Implications for future e-purse programs
A review of six e-purse programs in Hong Kong
and the United States reveals that the successful pro-
grams operate in captive markets and sometimes require
use of the card to establish a critical mass of users as
seen in the Direction Card, Navy Cash™, UCF Card,
and Octopus programs. For example, the Direction
Card program required EBT recipients to migrate from
paper food stamps to smart cards. Navy Cash™ is al-
most mandatory, since service personnel are unable
to make onboard purchases without the card. Univer-
sity of Central Florida students are required to use
the UCF Card in the school’s computer lab, and this
requirement resulted in an increase in the number of
students and staff using the card from 20 percent to
50 percent. Octopus leveraged the transportation indus-
try in Hong Kong, where over 70 percent of its com-
muters take public transportation every day. Commuters
who travel via rail and metro can only purchase mul-
tiple ride tickets using the Octopus card. Of course,
required use of smart cards is possible in closed-loop
environments; however, mandatory usage of smart
cards has little chance of successful implementation
in open-loop environments where consumers are ac-
customed to payment choices.
Octopus’s initial focus on the transportation sec-
tor also supports Van Hove’s (2004) observation that
successful smart card programs typically receive sup-
port from key players in at least one of the following:
public transportation, public telephones, parking meters,
or vending machines. Public transportation proved to
be the conduit for establishing critical mass in Hong
Kong. Is such a system feasible in the United States?
Greg Garback (2005), executive officer of the Finance
Department of the Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority, indicates that U.S. transportation
companies are investing $1 billion to improve their
payment infrastructures through the use of contact-
less smart card technology. Cities with multimodal
public transportation (trains, buses, subways, or fer-
ries) like Chicago, Seattle, San Diego, Los Angeles,
Boston, Houston, Atlanta, and San Francisco have
installed contactless smart card systems. These re-
gional transportation systems may one day lead to a
single transit card that can be used in multiple cities.
The Netherlands is currently installing such a
cross-country transportation system, which should be
completed by 2006 (ASK, 2004). Octopus is provid-
ing back office support and operational expertise on
the project (Tai, 2005). However, compared with the
United States, both the Netherlands and Hong Kong
are extremely small geographic areas, which certain-
ly facilitate the implementation of a systemwide or
countrywide e-purse strategy, as Van Hove (2004) ob-
serves. Furthermore, Hong Kong residents use public
transportation daily. By comparison, the U.S. Census
Bureau (2004) reports that there is only one U.S. city
where the majority of the population (55 percent)
takes public transportation—New York City. Other
cities with a population of 250,000 or more have a
smaller percentage of the population that takes public
transportation each day.
Because the vast majority of commuters in the
United States as a whole (77 percent) drive to work
alone, some payment analysts argue that the RFID
technology currently used in tollway systems in some
metropolitan areas may be expanded to the retail sec-
tor in the future.15 In fact, the E-ZPass system used
by commuters in the northeastern United States con-
ducted such a trial at two McDonald’s drive-thru win-
dows on Long Island, NY. In the American Banker,
Wade (2004) reported, however, that the co-owner
of these fast food restaurants had no plans to accept
E-ZPass at the four other McDonald’s he owned; that
he was more excited about the possibility of accepting
credit cards because they are more ubiquitous; that
the E-ZPass system was more complicated to set up;
and that it would be an uphill challenge to reach broad-
based adoption. Part of the difficulty relates to the
technology. The transponder that drivers use to store
value and record tolls is about the size of a deck of
cards, which makes it practical for tolls and drive-thru
restaurants but not for a typical retail environment.
Moreover, a widespread number of merchants would43 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
have to bear the cost of installing smart card readers
and a critical mass of consumers would have to pre-
fer the device over other payment alternatives to make
it successful.
While we have seen that some programs require
smart card usage, this strategy does not guarantee suc-
cess. The Ohio Direction Card program, which re-
quired EBT recipients to access benefits through the
Direction Card, had the highest average daily trans-
action values of the six e-purse programs surveyed,
well above the one million users that Goldfinger (1998)
estimated would be necessary to offset infrastructure
costs. However, Ohio’s EBT system failed on account
of the higher cost of the offline infrastructure relative
to online systems. The Mcard program failed for the
same reason. Therefore, a second key factor in a suc-
cessful smart card program is overall cost compared
with other payment alternatives. As such, the Navy
Cash™, EagleCash, and UCF Card programs should
be monitored over time. If the overall costs of these
programs are higher than other payment technologies,
their long-term success may be in jeopardy. This con-
cern may be mitigated to some extent for Navy Cash™
because of the security that the card provides for ship
check in.
A third key ingredient for a successful e-purse pro-
gram is compelling incentives for consumers to use
and for merchants to accept the new payment device
frequently. In terms of Chakravorti’s (2004) framework,
Octopus offers consumers and merchants simultaneous
benefits that are not provided by existing payment
systems. For consumers, Octopus completes transac-
tions faster than cash, provides an automatic reload
feature, offers loyalty programs, and is the only e-purse
surveyed that allows the purchase of goods up to a
negative value. Merchants that accept the Octopus
card benefit from quicker transaction times and ad hoc
loyalty programs, as well as lower fees compared
with those for credit cards. Nevertheless, a handful of
retailers have found that the merchant transaction fees
are too high and have withdrawn from the program.
When analysts predicted the success of e-purses
during the 1990s, the main benefit envisioned was a
cash substitute for small-value purchases. Octopus
concentrates on the micropayments environment and
provides merchants with reduced cash handling costs.
However, Van Hove (2001) argues that merchants
experience increased costs in the short term by sup-
porting two separate infrastructures until a critical
mass of e-purse users is established. The Navy Cash™
program was successful in substituting cash entirely
for crew members on board ships, resulting in signif-
icant cost savings. Despite the University of Michigan’s
desire to replace coin-intensive transactions like
those for pay phones, parking meters, and parking
facilities, Mcard’s technology was unable to support
these devices.
In the United States, credit cards rather than
e-purses may fill the micropayments gap. For example,
some parking meters in Chicago accept credit cards,
and the credit card industry plans to continue intro-
ducing contactless cards to speed payment. JPMor-
gan Chase & Co., the largest credit card issuer in the
United States, has announced that it will issue millions
of new contactless credit cards. American Express Co.
plans to issue its contactless card, ExpressPay, to new
customers in June 2006. More importantly, Visa, Master-
Card, and American Express have agreed to a standard
that enables properly equipped POS readers to accept
contactless credit cards (Sidel, 2005). The success of
contactless credit cards in filling the micropayments
gap relies on two factors: a critical mass of consumers
that are able to find enough chip reading terminals to
use these cards frequently and a widespread number of
retailers that view fees for small-value transactions on
these cards affordable.
The final critical ingredient for a successful smart
card program is technology that is well tested and ad-
dresses standards issues before rollout. As seen in the
Mcard program (see appendix), technological difficulties
decreased the adoption rate and contributed to the
overall failure of the program.16 In contrast, Octopus
had very few problems in the initial rollout, and after
7-Eleven’s implementation in the retail sector, Hong
Kong’s consumers pressed other merchants to accept
the card as well. The UCF Card program reflects a
similar desire from merchants and users to expand
card usage; however, the UCF Card program is the
only one with multiple e-purses and requires merchants
to select the correct e-purse from which to deduct a
transaction. A more streamlined technology that in-
cludes a single e-purse may increase adoption, but at
the same time, a single e-purse may negatively affect
parents’ sense of control over funds being spent for
school-related purposes.
Octopus also established interoperability between
the various transportation providers before the program
was launched, which smoothed its expansion into the
retail sector. Still, Octopus may face interoperability
issues in the future as Asia migrates to Europay/Mas-
terCard/Visa (EMV) compliant credit cards. EMV fa-
cilitates the introduction of chip technology into the
international payment systems by developing joint
specifications for issuance, acceptance, and interop-
erability of chip-based debit and credit card transac-
tions. An ePaynews.com article (Trintech Group Plc,44 4Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
2004) reports that the Chinese banking industry is
scheduled to complete a Chinese version of the EMV
standard prior to issuing EMV chip cards.
It is difficult to anticipate what impact the EMV
initiative might have on Octopus. One possibility is
that merchants may be reluctant to have two separate
smart card readers—one for Octopus cards and one
for EMV credit and debit cards. Instead, they may
want the computer chips on Octopus cards to be EMV
compliant and POS terminals for the Octopus card
and for EMV credit and debit cards to be integrated.
This option will likely result in additional costs relat-
ed to issuing new cards and to integrating existing
card readers for both Octopus Cards Ltd. and its mer-
chants. Some of these costs will likely be passed on
to consumers. Another possibility is that the relatively
low cost of Octopus transactions for merchants may
offset the expense of maintaining dual infrastructures.
Military cards may also face interoperability and
cost issues because of some new initiatives in the United
States, such as the Government Smart Card (GSC)
initiative and Homeland Security Presidential Direc-
tive (HSPD) 12. GSC is designed to adopt smart card
technology for every federal employee for a wide range
of purposes, such as building access. HSPD 12 estab-
lishes government-wide standards for secure and reliable
forms of identification issued by the federal govern-
ment to its employees and contractors (White House,
Office of the Press Secretary, 2004). Open standards on
how to build a smart card infrastructure across all fed-
eral agencies are being published, and presumably,
military cards will need to conform to these standards.
Conclusion
Of the six e-purse programs reviewed, Octopus
and Navy Cash™ have come closest to creating the
cashless world foretold by many analysts in the 1990s.
While the Navy Cash™ program entirely replaces
cash on board ships equipped with the system, the scale
of the program is far smaller than that of Octopus,
which used the transportation industry to achieve criti-
cal mass. The Octopus model may be difficult to rep-
licate here because the U.S. population is much larger,
is more geographically dispersed, and does not rely
as heavily on public transportation. In addition, the
United States is a less cash-intensive society compared
with Hong Kong, where an e-purse for small-value
transactions may have more utility. The United States
also has an efficient, advanced, and inexpensive tele-
communications infrastructure for debit, credit, pay-
roll, and gift cards that has relatively low levels of fraud.
One way to establish critical mass is to require
use of smart cards over other payment alternatives, as
seen in the Direction Card program in Ohio. However,
even if usage is mandatory, the overall cost of a smart
card system relative to other payment options is criti-
cally important to its success. Required usage is also
impractical in an open-loop environment where con-
sumers are accustomed to payment choices.
Successful e-purse programs also provide con-
sumers and merchants with powerful incentives to use
and accept the card. Octopus has been highly success-
ful in this regard; still, a handful of merchants have
found the fees too high and defected from the program.
Finally, technology that is well tested and addresses
standards issues before rollout is another factor in a
successful e-purse program. Inferior technology helped
doom the Mcard program, while Octopus provides a
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NOTES
1Smart cards are credit-card-sized plastic cards embedded with a
microchip that are more difficult to counterfeit and can store more
information than magnetic stripe cards.
2The geographic concentration of the potential users of an e-purse
is also important. For example, it would be cheaper to support one
million smart card users in a concentrated market like Hong Kong
versus one million smart card users in the whole of China.
3Hong Kong has had a stable exchange rate of HK$7.8 to US$1
since the mid-1980s; its GDP was US$158 billion in 2003.
4For a detailed discussion of the New York City trial, see Van
Hove (2001).
5While some retailers and credit card companies, such as Target
Corporation and American Express, have added computer chips
that do not have stored-value capabilities to their cards, their cus-
tomer programs have either failed or have not established a critical
mass of users.
6For a discussion of the open-loop Mondex trial in Hong Kong,
see Westland et al. (1998). Electronic Transaction Association (2001)
discusses the Atlanta Olympics e-purse trial. Again, for a detailed
discussion of the New York City trial, see Van Hove (2001).
7Total Octopus transactions in 1998 are unavailable. Using current
statistics of 8.3 million daily Octopus transactions, this would
represent a failure rate of 0.01 percent.
8There have been no announcements of Wyoming’s intention to
discontinue its smart card program, which is used to administer
the EBT program and the Women, Infants, and Children (WIC)
program. An industry source indicates that if an online WIC pro-
gram pilot by the state of Washington proves to be a success and
a good business strategy, then Wyoming will be open to the best
business case when it rebids its EBT services.
9Out-of-state stores accepting smart cards are generally located
near Ohio’s and Wyoming’s state borders.
10The Mcard’s concurrent programs included Entrée Plus, BankStripe,
a calling card program, and a chip program. Entrée Plus transac-
tions were deducted from the school’s pre-established funds pool.
BankStripe transactions were deducted from the cardholder’s First
of America checking account. Calling card transactions were billed
in one of two ways—on the student’s phone bill or on a prepaid
basis through Ameritech. Chip transactions were deducted from
the stored value on the card (Doyle, 2005).
11Enhancements to the Mcard were offered late in the program,
but failed to have a positive effect on usage. These included migrating
to an open debit card network, offering free funds transfers from
First of America checking accounts to the chip, providing visitors
with loaded Mcards for meals and other sundries, promoting mer-
chants in monthly newsletters, and reducing the cost of terminals.
Other incentives included distributing coupons from participating
merchants to students paying with the Mcard, offering students
who watched a training video about the card $5 on the chip, and
providing vending machine and merchant discounts when the
card was used instead of cash (Doyle, 2005).
12Unless indicated otherwise, information on the UCF Card is from
the University of Central Florida (2005).
13Additional information was taken from the U.S. Department of
the Treasury, Financial Management Service (2005).
14A third program, EZpay, provides all U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force,
and U.S. Marine basic trainees with a disposable EZpay card with
a fixed amount of electronic currency for purchases at base stores,
beauty and barber shops, cleaners, gift shops, museums, phone
centers, photo stores, and video stores. The amount loaded on the
card is deducted from the trainee’s first paycheck (Mackenzie, 2004).
15After paying for tolls in advance, drivers are issued a transponder
about the size of a deck of cards that is mounted on the windshield
and allows them to pass through a tollbooth without stopping the
vehicle. The card can be linked to a consumer’s debit or credit
card to automatically replenish funds.
16Malfunctioning technology also impeded card adoption in the
Mondex and Visa Cash trial in New York City.49 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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